the constitution last referred to. When, therefore, the States were, by the fourteenth amendment, absolutely prohibited from abridging the privileges of the citizen, either by enforcing existing laws, or by the making of new laws, the right of every "citizen" to the full exercise of this privilege, as against State action, was absolutely secured. Chancellor Kent and Judge Story both refer to the opinion of Mr. Justice Washington, above quoted, with approbation. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in the case of _Amy, a woman of color, vs. Smith (1 Littell's Rep. 326)_, discussed with great ability the questions as to what constituted citizenship, and what were the "privileges and immunities of citizens" which were secured by Sec. 2, Art. 4, of the constitution, and they showed, by an unanswerable argument, that the term "citizens," as there used, was confined to those who were entitled to the enjoyment of the elective franchise, and that that was among the highest of the "privileges and immunities" secured to the citizen by that section. The court say that, "to be a citizen it is necessary that he should be entitled to the enjoyment of these privileges and immunities, upon the same terms upon which they are conferred upon other citizens; and unless he is so entitled, _he cannot, in the proper sense of the term, be a citizen_." In the case of _Scott vs. Sanford (19 How. 404)_, Chief Justice Taney says: "The words 'people of the United States,' and 'citizens,' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing; they describe the _political body, who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power, and conduct the government through their representatives_. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people, and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty." Mr. Justice Daniel, in the same case, (p. 476), says: "Upon the principles of etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from _civitas_, conveys the idea of connection or identification with the state or government, and a participation in its functions. But beyond this, there is not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment of _an entire equality of privileges, civil and political_." Similar references might be made to an indefinite extent, but enough has been said to show that the term citizen, in the language of Mr. Justice Daniel, conveys the idea "of identification with the state or government, and a participation in its functions." Beyond question, therefore, the first section of the fourteenth amendment, by placing the citizenship of women upon a par with that of men, and declaring that the "privileges and immunities" of the citizen