This proposition appears to me so obvious, that were it not for the severity to my client of the consequences which may follow a conviction, I should not deem it necessary to discuss it. To make out the offence, it is incumbent on the prosecution to show affirmatively, not only that the defendant knowingly voted, but that she so voted _knowing that she had no right to vote_. That is, the term "knowingly," applies, not to the fact of voting, but to the fact of _want of right_. Any other interpretation of the language would be absurd. We cannot conceive of a case where a party could vote without knowledge of the fact of voting, and to apply the term "knowingly" to the more act of voting, would make nonsense of the statute. This word was inserted as defining the essence of the offence, and it limits the criminality to cases where the voting is not only without right, but where it is done wilfully, with a _knowledge that it is without right_. Short of that there is no offence within the statute. This would be so upon well established principles, even if the word "knowingly" had been omitted, but that word was inserted to prevent the possibility of doubt on the subject, and to furnish security against the inability of stupid or prejudiced judges or jurors, to distinguish between wilful wrong and innocent mistake. If the statute had been merely, that "if at any election for representative in Congress any person shall vote without having a lawful right to vote, such person shall be deemed guilty of a crime," there could have been justly no conviction under it, without proof that the party voted _knowing_ that he had not a right to vote. If he voted innocently supposing he had the right to vote, but had not, it would not be an offence within the statute. An innocent mistake is not a crime, and no amount of judicial decisions can make it such. Mr. Bishop says, (1 Cr. Law, Sec.205): "There can be no crime unless _a culpable intent_ accompanies the criminal act." The same author, (1 Cr. Prac. Sec.521), repeated in other words, the same idea: "In order to render a party criminally responsible, _a vicious will_ must concur with a wrongful act." I quote from a more distinguished author: "_Felony is always accompanied with an evil intention, and therefore shall not be imputed to a mere mistake, or misanimadversion_, as where persons break open a door, in order to execute a warrant, which will not justify such proceeding: _Affectio enim tua nomen imponit operi tuo: item crimen non contrahitur nisi nocendi, voluntas intercedat_," which, as I understand, may read: "For your volition puts the name upon your act; and _a crime is not committed unless the will of the offender takes part in it_." 1 Hawk. P.C., p. 99, Ch. 85, Sec.3. This quotation by Hawkins is, I believe, from Bracton, which carries the principle back to a very early period in the existence of the common law. It is a principle, however, which underlies all law, and must have been recognized at all times, wherever criminal law has been administered, with even the slightest reference to the principles of