this end he consented, in 1823, to make a demonstration against the Greek rebels, but took very good care not to render too much service to the cause which he espoused. Thus, too, when he marched in the autumn of 1828 to the vicinity of the Danube, at the head of an army of 25,000 irregulars, it was not with the intention of attacking the Russians, but rather under the expectation that the necessities of the Sultan would afford him an opportunity of procuring the re-establishment of those 'Praetorian guards of Turkey.' The arrogant pretensions of Scodra Pacha were very strongly exemplified in the attitude which he assumed at the close of the campaign of 1829. Having in the first instance shown much dilatoriness in entering the field, he remained inactive near Widdin during the latter part of 1828 and the commencement of 1829, when, by operating in the rear of the Russians, he might have been most useful to the Turkish Seraskier. The treaty of peace, however, had been signed, and forwarded for ratification to Russia, when Scodra Pacha suddenly electrified both parties by objecting to its terms, and announcing his intention of continuing the war. He even marched to Philippopolis, whence he sent a message that he would arrive at Adrianople within eight days. This naturally caused Marshal Diebitsch some anxiety, since he was unaware of the Pacha's real policy, and believed him to be sincere in his protestations of vengeance against the invaders. A hasty summons was therefore sent to General Geismar, who consequently crossed the Danube at Rachova; and having turned, and subsequently forced, the Pass of Anatcha in the Balkans, easily defeated the Pacha, who made but small resistance. This and the approach of General Kisselef from Schumla put a finishing stroke to hostilities, and Scodra returned home to brood over the ill-success of his undertaking, and plan farther means of working mischief to the hated Mahmoud. The opportunity soon presented itself. Having succeeded in ridding himself of some of the Albanian leaders, the Sultan applied himself with vigour to the subjection of those in Bosnia who were adverse to his rule. In 1830 he sent uniforms to Travnik, which the Vizier immediately donned. This kindled the spark, and in the beginning of 1831 several thousand insurgents, under the command of Hussein Kapetan, the 'Sonai od Bosna,' or Dragon of Bosnia, attacked him in his fortress, and made him prisoner. So great was the abhorrence professed for the adoption of Christian clothing, that the unfortunate Vizier was compelled to perform solemn ablutions and to recite Moslem prayers, in order to purify himself from contamination. The standard of rebellion was now fairly unfurled, and within a few weeks a force of 25,000 men had collected. At the same time Mustapha Pacha, with 40,000 Albanians and others, made his appearance on the scene of action. Without delay an advance was made _en potence_, and it was confidently anticipated that Stamboul would fall before the insurgent arms. But the Sultan possessed both a cunning and able lieutenant in the Grand Vizier Redschid. This functionary contrived to dispense bribes so judiciously among the inferior Albanian chieftains, that they deserted en masse to the Turks, and thus rendered it imperative on Mustapha to take refuge in his fortress at Scutari. This he did in the anticipation of speedy relief by Hussein Kapetan and the Bosnians, who, despite the dissuasion of the Servian Prince Milosch,