were acting with too great caution. In Gallipoli they had failed, because at the very beginning they had not used their full strength. Now, again, knowing as they did all that depended upon it, bound as they were to the most loyal support of Serbia, the aid they sent was too small to be more than a drop in the bucket. It must be remembered, however, that the greatest leaders among the Allies were at all times opposed to in any way scattering their strength. They believed that the war was to be won in France. Military leaders in particular yielded under protest to the political leaders when expeditions of this character were undertaken. Certainly this is true, that the world believed that Serbia had a right to Allied assistance. The gallant little nation was fighting for her life, and public honor demanded that she should be aided. It was this strong feeling that led to the action that was taken, in spite of the military opinions. It was, however, too late. In the second week of October Serbia found herself faced by an enemy which was attacking her on three sides. She herself had been greatly weakened. Her losses in 1914, when she had driven Austria from her border, must have been at least two hundred thousand men. She had suffered from pestilence and famine. Her strength now could not have been more than two hundred thousand, and though she was fairly well supplied with munitions, she was so much outnumbered that she could hardly hope for success. On her west she was facing the Austro-German armies; on her east Bulgaria; on the south Albania. Her source of supplies was Saloniki and this was really her only hope. If the Allies at Saloniki could stop the Bulgarian movement, the Serbians might face again the Austro-Germans. They expected this help from the Allies. At Nish the town was decorated and the school children waited outside the station with bouquets to present to the coming reinforcements. But the Allies did not come. Von Mackensen's plan was simple enough. His object was to win a way to Constantinople. This could be done either by the control of the Danube or the Ottoman Railroad. To control the Danube he had to seize northeastern Serbia for the length of the river. This was comparatively easy and would give him a clear water way to the Bulgarian railways connected with Constantinople. The Ottoman railway was a harder route to win. It meant an advance to the southeast, which would clear the Moravo valley up to Nish, and then the Nishava valley up to Bulgaria. The movements involved were somewhat complex, but easily carried out on account of the very great numerical superiority of von Mackensen's forces. On September 19th Belgrade was bombarded. The Serbian positions were gradually destroyed. On the 7th of October the German armies crossed the Danube, and on the 8th the Serbians began to retreat. There was great destruction in Belgrade and the Bulgarian General, Mishitch, was forced slowly back to the foothills of the Tser range.